Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC by Gottlieb, Yaron
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 23
Number 4 Penn State International Law Review Article 16
5-1-2005
Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A
Proposal for Defining New Crimes under the
Rome Statute of the ICC
Yaron Gottlieb
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gottlieb, Yaron (2005) "Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes under the Rome Statute
of the ICC," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 23: No. 4, Article 16.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol23/iss4/16
Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural
Property: A Proposal for Defining New
Crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC
Yaron Gottlieb*
Abstract
"There are people whose hearts are made of stone;
There are stones with human hearts."
-Yosi Gamzo, Israel
Destruction of cultural property has been addressed by several
international conventions, yet it remains an acute universal phenomenon.
The first part of the paper examines the development of the
criminalization of destruction of cultural property under international
law. Following an assessment of the existing legal norms, the paper
concludes that the articulation of the crime in international instruments-
in particular under the Rome Statute of the ICC-is anachronistic,
incomplete, and inconsistent.
The second part of the paper therefore explores the need to
enunciate new crimes pertaining exclusively to protection of cultural
property. It proposes definitions for three new crimes within the
framework of the Rome Statute and discusses the elements of the
proposed crimes. The paper then outlines the principal points related to
the definition of "cultural property" and proposes a new definition to be
incorporated in the Rome Statute.
I. Introduction
Every nation has its own stones that possess "human" souls, its own
cultural heritage which represents the memories and uniqueness of the
* LL.M., NYU School of Law. This paper is based on a paper written for the
course "Transitional Justice in Times of Transition" taught by Professor Alex Borraine
and Professor Paul Van Zyl. I would like to thank Paul Van Zyl from the International
Center for Transitional Justice for his insightful comments on the paper.
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nation's people. That cultural heritage, which comprises tangible
property such as historical monuments as well as intangible heritage such
as folklore, frequently holds universal significance.
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of destruction of cultural property is
common and goes back to the early days of civilization. The special
value societies give to religious sites and cultural objects perpetuates the
desire to utilize the destruction of cultural property as a repressing tool
towards minorities within the society or as a manifestation that the old
regime was vanquished. Frequently, the destruction is only a by-product
of an armed conflict, yet with similar devastating results.
Throughout modem history, attempts have been made to enhance
the protection of cultural property on the international normative level.
The first chapter of this paper examines the developments of the
criminalization of destruction of cultural property under international
law, and concludes that the existing legal norms-in particular those
articulated by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court'-
present an obsolete and incoherent approach. The second chapter of this
paper explores the need to enunciate new crimes pertaining exclusively
to the destruction of cultural property. It proposes definitions for three
new crimes within the framework of the Rome Statute-two war crimes
and one crime against humanity-and discusses the elements of the
proposed crimes. The paper then continues with an outline of the
principal points related to the definition of "cultural property" and
proposes a new definition to be incorporated in the Rome Statute.
II. Criminalization of Destruction of Cultural Property Under
International Law
A. The Division Between Protection of Cultural Property During
Armed Conflicts and in Peacetime
The historical developments in the protection of cultural property,
as well as current normative approaches in the field, divide the threats to
cultural property into two general categories: threats that emanate from
armed conflicts and threats concerned in "peacetime.",2 For the most
1. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiatics on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter "The Rome Statute"].
2. Defining "armed conflict" and "peacetime" is, in and of itself, an intricate task
and a matter of dispute within the international community. For example, during the
preparatory work on the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, signed at the Hague, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (1954)
[hereinafter "The 1954 Convention"], a suggestion for defining "conflict" and listing the
conditions for the applicability of Article 19 of the convention concerning the protection
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part, the former category has received more attention in the international
arena, which has led to notable advancements in imposing criminal
responsibility on those involved in destruction of cultural property in
armed conflicts. Conversely, the general normative framework related to
individual accountability deriving from peacetime conducts remains
significantly weaker.
The justifications for the distinction between the two general
categories are questionable on the pragmatic level as well as on the
normative one.3 That division, however, will be methodologically used
in this paper for the sole purpose of depicting current international norms
and their proposed modifications.
B. The Status of the Crime Committed During Armed Conflicts
1. Developments in the Protection of Cultural Property until the
1990's
Destruction of enemy cultural property-whether utter destruction
or pillage-was originally considered a legitimate part of war. Even
religious property, often exempted from destruction due to its sacred
character, was sometimes targeted where belligerent parties shared
different religions, and even more so when the warfare itself stem from
these differences, as in the Crusades Wars.
The protection of cultural property was thus intertwined with the
laws of war. The first indications that cultural property was to be
protected came at the time of the Renaissance, 4 yet the first official
of cultural property in armed conflict not of an international character was not adopted.
See JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED
CONFLICT: COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS PROTOCOL, SIGNED ON 14 MAY,
1954 IN THE HAGUE, AND ON OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING
SUCH PROTECTION, 210-211 (Dartmouth, UNESCO Publishing, 1996). As this point
deserves a separate discussion, for the purpose of this paper it will suffice to follow the
definition of "armed conflict" prescribed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia ["ICTY"]: "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State." See
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 70, Case No. IT-94-1 (Oct.
2, 1995) (decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal Jurisdiction).
3. Indeed, the application of two different set of laws and their outcome have been
criticized by scholars. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on Criminal
Jurisdiction in International Protection of Cultural Property, 10 SYR. J. INT'L. L. & COM.
281, 287 (1983); Victoria A. Birov, Prizes or Plunder? The Pillage of Works of Art and
the International Law of War, 30 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 201, 222 (1997).
4. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at para. 229, n. 779,
Case No. IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter "The Strugar Case"]; TOMAN, supra
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governmental and inter-governmental legal documents that forbade
destruction of cultural property were created in the late-nineteenth
century. The concept of protecting certain forms of immovable property
including "buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes" and "historic monuments" was later adopted by the Hague
Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of Wars on Land.6
World War I, however, proved that states often ignore the laws of
war, and that endeavors to adjudicate the perpetrators ex-post-facto have
failed.7 It was not until the Nuremberg Trials, which followed World
War II, that a true attempt to enforce humanitarian law and to establish
individual accountability was made by the international community.
Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter included among its list of war
crimes "plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity." 8 Thus, the Charter and the ensuing trials, where German
Nazis were convicted for the crime of plunder, are considered the first
true international enforcement of protection of cultural property. 9
The acknowledgement by the international community of the need
for a separate instrument with the sole purpose of protecting cultural
property during armed conflicts led to the drafting and signing of the
1954 Hague Convention. Article 28 of the 1954 Convention provides
that "the High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the
framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to
prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons,
of whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach
note 2, at 4-10.
5. The first legal document that referred to the protection of cultural property was
the U.S. Lieber Code. See id.; Articles 35 and 36 of Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by
Abraham Lincoln, April 24, 1863. The first international document on the subject,
although never ratified, was the 1874 Declaration of Brussels. See Project of an
International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Declaration of
Brussels), adopted by the conference of Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, 4 Martens Noveua
Recueil (ser. 2) 219, Article 18(g).
6. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 27, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277 (a907), T.S. No. 539, 3 Martenese Noveua Recueil (ser. 3) 461 [hereinafter
"The 1907 Convention"].
7. Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. OF INT'L L. 1
(1991).
8. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 18, 1945; 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, E.A.S. No. 472 (Aug.
18, 1945).
9. See M.CHERIF BASSIOUNI & JAMES A.R.NAFZIGER, PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW I 949, 954 (M.Cherif Bassiouni ed. 2nd ed.)
(1999).
[Vol. 23:4
CRIMINALIZING DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
of the present Convention.' ' l Destruction of cultural property may thus
yield individual accountability," yet the effectiveness of the provision
was undermined by a failure to enumerate specific offenses that could
give rise to criminal prosecutions.' 2 Furthermore, the implementation
and enforcement of article 28 was left solely to member states. As a
result, member states are given an excessive margin of discretion.13
The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
reiterated the obligation to protect cultural property. 14 In the Jokic Case,
the ICTY Trial Chamber emphasized that both Protocols expanded the
scope of protection by outlawing "any acts of hostility directed against
the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples."'15 The Tribunal
also adopted the ICRC Commentary to Protocol I, according to which the
Protocols prohibited direct attacks against cultural property whether or
not the attacks result in actual damage, and provided the property
immunity that is "clearly additional to the protection attached to civilian
objects.' 16
It appears, however, that despite the advancements on the
conventional level, the protection proved to be ineffective in most
conflicts which followed the 1954 Convention and the 1977 Protocols.
An exception, perhaps the most successful implementation of the notions
prescribed by the 1954 Convention, occurred during the Gulf War I in
1991, where the United States, itself not a party to the 1954 Convention,
attempted to avoid the destruction of cultural property with the creation
of "no-fire-target-list" of places where cultural property was known to
10. 1954 Convention art. 28.
11. In the Strugar Case, the Trial Chamber referred, inter alia, to Article 28 of the
1954 Convention, to establish its conclusion that Articles 3(b) and 3(d) of the Tribunal's
Statute (criminalizing the destruction of civilian property, including the destruction of
cultural property ), entail individual criminal responsibility. See Prosecutor v. Strugar,
Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at para. 223, Case No. IT-0 1 -42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
12. See David Keane, The Failure to Protect Cultural Property in Wartime, 14
DEPAUL-LCA J.ART & ENT. L. 1, 15 (2004). See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules
for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, 81 INT'L REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSs Nos. 835 (the author argues that Article 28 "has largely remained a dead letter"
due to that problem).
13. See DIETER FLECK, ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 403 (2001).
14. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 53, 1125
U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter "Protocol I"]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts art. 16, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter "Protocol II"].
15. See Prosecutor v. Jokic, Sentencing Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 50,
Case IT-01-42/1-S (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter "The Jokic Case"].
16. Id.
2005]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
exist. 17 Other armed conflicts such as the one in the former Yugoslavia,
have resulted in significant demolition of cultural property.
2. The Statutes of International Tribunals and the International
Criminal Court
The "resurrection" of the notion of indicting individuals for grave
crimes before international or hybrid criminal tribunals did not exclude
the crime of destruction of cultural property, although different powers
were given to the tribunals in that respect. Article 3(d) of the Statute
establishing the ICTY specifically referred to destruction of cultural
property by criminalizing acts of "seizure of, destruction or willful
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education,
the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and
science." 18  Article 7 of the Cambodian Law, which established the
Extraordinary Chambers for the prosecution of crimes committed by the
Khmer Rouge regime, provided the Chambers with the power "to bring
to trial all Suspects most responsible for the destruction of cultural
property during armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention
for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and
which were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6
January 1979." 19
In comparison, Article 3 of the Statute establishing the Rwandan
Tribunal explicitly mentions only plunder as a war crime related to
destruction of cultural property, although the tribunal is not limited by
the list of the enumerated violations in that article.20 A similar approach
17. See BASSIOUNI & NAFZIGER, supra note 9. It should be mentioned, however, that
information received from archeologists suggest the existence of disparities between the
official U.S. policy and the actual damage caused to certain sites. See Marion Forsyth,
Casualties of War: The Destruction of lraq 's Cultural Heritage as a Result of U.S. Action
During and After the 1991 Gulf War, 14 DEPAUL LCA J. ART& ENT. L. 73 (2004).
18. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Protection of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res., U.N. SCOR, 4 8th Sess., 3217 
th
mtg, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M 1159 [hereinafter "The
ICTY Statute"]. Further indirect protection for cultural property was provided by
Articles 3(c) of the ICTY Statute, which criminalizes attacks on enemy property, and
articles 2(d), 3(b), and 3(e) of the ICTY Statute, which criminalize destruction and
plunder of enemy property.
19. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,
Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/0801/12, available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/
english/index.htm [hereinafter "The Cambodian Statute"].
20. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Protection of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, between 1 Jan
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was taken by the Statute establishing the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.2 1
The disparity between the ICTY and the Cambodian Statutes on the
one hand and the ICTR and Sierra Leone Statutes on the other hand
clearly derives from the perception that the property destroyed in
Rwanda and Sierra Leone was not considered to be of universal cultural
value.22  Conversely, the fighting in former Yugoslavia involved
enormous destruction of cultural property that was also well documented
at the time. Particular international attention (alas not enough to lead to a
sufficient action) was drawn to the massive bombardments on the Old
Town of Dubrovnik, a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site in its
entirety, where many buildings were marked with the symbols mandated
by the 1954 Convention.23 Thus, the framers of the ICTY planned on
prosecuting those responsible for the ruthless attack. Indeed, indictments
containing separate charges based on the ICTY Statute's articles cited
above have been brought against some of the Serbian commanders who
ordered the bombings and conducted the attack on the Old Town.24
Similar reasoning led to the explicit empowerment of the Cambodian
1994 and 31 Dec. 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 4 9th Sess., 3453 rd. mtg, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M 1598 [hereinafter "The ICTR Statute"].
21. Article 3(f) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Annex to the
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002. Article
5 of the Statute also refers to general destruction of property (such as houses and public
building) under Sierra Leonean law, yet without specific mentioning of destruction of
cultural property.
22. See Franseco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of
Bamiyan and International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 619 (2003). The authors argued that
the disparities between the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes may be explained "by the
negligible impact that the atrocities committed in Rwanda had on cultural heritage of
international importance." Naturally, this presumption could be challenged, particularly
in reference to the destruction of intangible cultural property (such as traditions and
folklore) as a result of the mass killings that took place in these countries.
23. An analysis conducted by the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments,
in conjunction with UNESCO, found that of the 824 buildings in the Old Town, 563 had
been hit by projectiles in 1991 and 1992, and 314 direct hits were recorded on buildings
facades and on the paving of streets and squares. See Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Third
Amended Indictment, para. 29, Case No. IT-0 1-42-PT (Dec. 10, 2003). In its judgment
in this case, the Trial Chamber found that as a result of the attack on the Old Town, led
by forces under the command of the accused on December 6, 1991, 52 buildings of the
Old Town were damaged, six of which were completely destroyed. Among these
damaged buildings were monasteries, churches, a mosque, a synagogue and palaces. See
The Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at par. 318-320, 461, Case
IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
24. See Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed
Conflict: The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
14 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (Spring 2001) (provides an analysis of the ICTY jurisprudence).
Pertinent judgments in these cases will be further discussed in this paper.
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Extraordinary Chambers to adjudicate cases concerning destruction of
cultural property. The Khmer Rouge acts of destruction included
systematic attacks against minorities' religious sites such as destroying
most of the country's 3,000 Buddhist pagodas, damaging Muslim
mosques of the Cham people, and attacking Christian places of
worship.25 In addition, the Khmer Rouge engaged in a "holy war"
against minorities as well as the country's intellectuals and art
performers. The "holistic social engineering" conducted by Pol Pot and
his followers spared almost no Buddhist monks and hardly any art
performers.26
One of the most important landmarks in the field of international
criminal law is the establishment of the International Criminal Court
["ICC"]. Article 8 of the Rome Statute, reflecting much of the existing
laws of war, defines a number of war crimes that may be applied in cases
related to the destruction of cultural property: "Extensive destruction
and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly" [Article 8(2)(a)(iv)]; 27
"Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects
which are not military objectives" [Article 8(2)(b)(ii)]; "Intentionally
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places
where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military
objectives" [Article 8(2)(b)(ix)]; "Destroying or seizing the enemy's
property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war" [Article 8(2)(b)(xiii)]; and "Pillaging a town or
place, even when taken by assault" [Article 8(2)(b)(xvi]. Article 8(2)(e)
enumerates few similar serious violations related to the laws and customs
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.
28
25. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 294
[Oxford University Press, 2 nd ed. 2001].
26. It is estimated that as a result of Khmer Rouge policies, nine out of ten
performers died during the Cambodian genocide, leading to a near abolishment of
traditional Cambodian performing arts-a unique intangible cultural heritage of the
society. See World Education (Asia Programs/Special Projects), Cambodian Master
Performers Program at http://www.cambodianmasters.org (last visited April 8, 2005).
27. Article 8(2)(a)(vi) refers to grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. An
example for destruction of cultural property that was considered a grave breach was the
destruction of the Old Town of Dubrovnik. See Final Report of the United Nations
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 789,
Destruction of Cultural Property (Annex 11), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add. 2 (Vol. V)
(1994); David Keane, supra note 12, at 24.
28. See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(e)(iv) and art. 8(2)(e)(v), which are identical to
Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) respectively. The decision to recognize fewer
crimes in cases of non-international conflicts derives from the concern of an international
intervention in domestic affairs, as was reflected in the contentious debate in the Rome
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An examination of the above Statutes and the Rome Statute in
particular suggests that their approach to the field of protection of
cultural property is unsatisfactory. To begin with, the term "cultural
property" does not exist in the Statutes. Rather, the Statutes borrowed,
without much elaboration, the traditional language used by conventions
dealing with the laws of war, namely the 1907 Hague Convention and
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.2 9
A primary objective of these laws of war was to differentiate
between the civilian population and combatants, between civilian objects
and military objectives. 30 Hence, the protection of cultural property-a
specific form of civilian property-was directly related to the general
protection of civilian objects. As a result of this broad categorization,
article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute-the only article which protects
specific types of cultural property31 -provides the same level of
protection to historic monuments as to "hospitals and places where the
wound and sick were collected., 32  Although that approach may be
considered as elevated protection of cultural property, there is a clear
distinction between the two types of protected institutions: Civilian
immovable objects (such as hospitals) are protected in wartime due to
their "human cargo" or important civil services they offer.
Consequently, they stand to lose the protected status when civilians are
not within their confines or when their services are no longer in need.
Cultural property, on the other hand, should be protected regardless of
transient factors such as the presence of people within its borders or their
Conference regarding the inclusion of Article 8(2)(e) in the Rome Statute. That concern
also led to the qualification of that article by Article 8(2)(f), which states that Article
8(2)(e) "does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature." See Rome Statute
art. 8(2)(f).
29. See e.g., Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(ii) (adopted, almost verbatim, Article 27 of
the 1907 Convention). Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute was also based on Article 27 of
the 1907 Hague Convention. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber,
at para. 229, Case IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
30. The ICTY reiterated the importance of this principle in several decisions. For
example, in the Kordic Case, the Appeals Chamber stated that: "The prohibition against
attacking civilians stems from a fundamental principle of international humanitarian law,
the principle of distinction, which obliges warring parties to distinguish at all times
between the civilian population and combatants, between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly to direct military operations only against military objectives."
See Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 54, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A (Dec. 17, 2004); see also, Prosecutor v. Stugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial
Chamber, at para. 225, Case IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
31. The ICTY viewed the offence in Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute (which is
similar to Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute) as lex specialis as far as acts against
cultural heritage are concerned. See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment, ICTY
Trial Chamber, para 361, Case No. IT-94-14/2-T (Feb. 26, 2001).
32. See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(ix); see also, the 1907 Convention art. 27.
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need for a particular service. Thus, although cultural property is often
real and tangible, its shield is abstract and everlasting.
Several others principal characteristics evolved from the objective
of protecting civilians during armed conflicts. First, article 8(2)(b)(ix) of
the Rome Statute defines all protected property other than historic
monuments by their nature or purpose.33 The "purpose" test, however, is
obsolete and unconvincing on both doctrinal and pragmatic grounds. As
explained above, applying that test suggests that the property may lose its
protective nature when its purpose is no longer fulfilled. A better
approach would define and distinguish cultural property from other types
of property using a "cultural value test," namely a test based on the
property's substantial contribution to the cultural heritage of the human
race. Indeed, this test is applied-although with variations-in the
definitions of cultural property found in several international
conventions.34
Secondly, the protection focuses on immovable objects. The
contents of protected buildings, although sometimes containing more
significant heritage than the buildings themselves, is not protected by
article 8(2)(b)(ix). Movable cultural property is thus protected only
through other provisions in the Rome Statute, which generally address
the destruction of enemy property regardless of its unique cultural and
contribution to humanity.
Another major drawback of the Rome Statute is the exception
allowing attacks on cultural property due to "military necessity, 36 or if
the property becomes a "military objective. 37 This doctrine, found also
in other related conventions, 38 may seriously threaten the protection of
cultural property in armed conflicts since the exceptions to the rule
33. See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(ix) ("Intentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes.
(emphasis added)).
34. See, e.g., the definition of cultural property of The 1954 Convention art. 1
("movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every
people ... "); and the definition of cultural heritage in Article 1 of The Convention
Concerning Protection of World Cultural Property and Natural Heritage, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 48 /PC/1 I/Add. 3, 15 (1972) [hereinafter "The 1972 Convention"], which is
based on the property's "outstanding universal value."
35. See, e.g., Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) ("Destroying or seizing the enemy's
property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war").
36. See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(iv) and art. 8(2)(b)(xiii).
37. See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(ii), art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and art. 8(2)(e)(iv).
38. See, e.g., 1954 Convention art. 4 and art. 11; see also 1977 Protocol I art. 52.
Based on these conventions and on the ICTY Statute, the ICTY case-law confirmed this
exception. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blasik, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 185,
Case No. IT-95-14-T (May 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial
Chamber, at para. 310, Case IT-0I-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
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frequently evolve to normative behavior. 39  It was therefore correctly
noted that to provide full protection to cultural property this doctrine
"must be eliminated or at least circumscribed. 4 °
The Rome Statute also fails to criminalize the use of cultural
property by the holder of the property in support of a military action.
The ban on that wrongful use was recognized by the 1977 Protocols, 1
and in the ICTY jurisprudence.4 2 Recent events in the war in Iraq such
as the battles in the town of Faluja, where insurgents consistently turned
Mosques into arms depots and sanctuaries, have proven that problem to
be a serious threat to the protection of cultural property.
All in all, the decision of the drafters of the Rome Statute to apply
the more conservative approach to the crime of destruction of cultural
property appears surprising in light of the significant developments in the
field since World War II and in view of the sights of destruction
witnessed by the world in recent armed conflicts such as in the former
Yugoslavia. Indeed, it seems that the opportunity to come full circle on
the normative level of the protection of cultural property in armed
conflicts-from only one segment of traditional laws of war to a
separate, independent, and well-defined war crime-was overlooked by
the delegates to Rome Conference.
3. The 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Convention
The most recent normative contribution to the field of protection of
cultural property in armed conflicts is found in the 1999 Second Protocol
to the 1954 Convention.4 3 The 1999 Protocol applies-in its entirety to
39. For example, during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs invoked
military necessity to justify their attacks on Dubrovnik. See Prosecutor v. Strugar,
Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at para. 182, Case IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005). See also,
Yugoslav Army Rejects Authenticity of Report, United Press Int'l, Dec. 5, 1991,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Birov, supra note 3, at 237.
40. Id. at 241. The author persuasively argues that the military necessity exception,
which was already anachronistic at the time of the adoption of the 1954 Convention, is no
longer demanded by modem weapons technology. Id. at 242.
41. Article 53 of Protocol I and Article 16 of Protocol II prohibit the use of all
cultural objects and places of worship (defined in these Protocols as "historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples") in support of a military effort.
42. In the Strugar Case, the Trial Chamber ruled that if the Croatian defenders had
defensive military positions in the Old Town of Dubrovnik, it would have been "a clear
violation of the World Heritage protected status of the Old Town." See Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at para. 183, Case IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
Based on the evidence presented in that case, the Tribunal found no evidence to support
the argument that the Croatian forces indeed establish such military positions, and
asserted that even if such evidence existed it would not have justified the nature, extent,
and duration of the attack on the Old Town. Id. at para. 193, 195.
43. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the protection of Cultural Property
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both international and non-international armed conflicts, although it
adopted the Rome Statute's cautious approach towards the latter form of
armed conflicts. 4
Among the key areas of development by the 1999 Protocol were the
creation of a Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property,45 and the
elaboration of a system that provides enhanced protection to certain types
of cultural property.46 Moreover, the 1999 Protocol defined the term
"military objective" and made important clarifications in reference to the
"military necessity" exception found in the 1954 Convention as well as
to the authority to invoke it.
47
Most notably for the cause of criminalizing destruction of cultural
property, the 1999 Protocol went a further step than the 1954 Convention
and expanded upon the issue of individual criminal responsibility. First,
it enumerated acts which are considered serious violations of the
Protocol: (a) making cultural property under enhanced protection the
object of attack; (b) using cultural property under enhanced protection or
its immediate surroundings in support of military action; (c) extensive
destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected under the 1954
Convention and the Protocol; (d) making cultural property protected
under the 1954 Convention and the Protocol the object of attack; and
(e) theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed
against cultural property protected under the 1954 Convention.48 The
first three offenses listed above correspond to the Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Protocol I, while the latter two are considered to be serious
violations of the 1954 Convention and the 1999 Protocol.49 Worth
in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at the Hague, 26 March 1999 [hereinafter "The
1999 Protocol"] at http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E.
The Protocol entered into force on Mar. 9, 2003, and, as of Jan. 2005, has twenty-six
State parties. Id.
44. The 1999 Protocol, art. 22, para. 1 states that: "This Protocol shall apply in the
event of an armed conflict not of an international character, occurring within the territory
of one of the Parties." Article 22, Paragraph 2 of the 1999 Protocol duplicates the
language of Paragraph 2(f) of the Rome Statute: "This Protocol shall not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence and other acts of a similar nature."
45. The 1999 Protocol ch. 6 art.24.
46. Id. at ch. 3. That system departs from the "special protection" system
established by the 1954 Convention.
47. Id. at art. 1, 6, 13.
48. Id. art. 15. In addition, Article 21 of the 1999 Protocol requires member parties
to take
[S]uch legislative, administrative or disciplinary measures as may be necessary
to suppress the following acts when committed intentionally: (a) any use of
cultural property in violation of the Convention or this Protocol; (b) any illicit
export, other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property from
occupied territory in violation of the Convention or this Protocol.
49. Henckaerts, supra note 12, at 11; Keane, supra note 12, at 33-34.
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noting is the concept of imposing criminal responsibility also on the
holder of the property,5 ° in comparison to the current existing norms
under the Rome Statute, where such responsibility is attached only to the
attacker side.
In addition, the 1999 Protocol obliged each member state to
establish jurisdiction over perpetrators, 51 and to either extradite offenders
who are found in its territories or prosecute them "without exception
whatsoever and without undue delay ... through proceedings in
accordance with its domestic law or with, if applicable, the relevant rules
of international law."52 The obligation to extradite or prosecute is found
in international law in reference to particularly grave crimes.53 Thus, it
reflects the strong message conveyed by the Protocol's Member Parties
as to the gravity and status of the crimes. To conclude, the 1999 Protocol
presents a more modern and desired normative platform for the
protection of cultural property in armed conflict in comparison to the one
found in the Rome Statute.
4. Criminalization of Destruction of Cultural Property During
Armed Conflicts as Customary International Law
Despite the significant developments in the field-at least on the
normative level-it remains unclear whether protection of cultural
property has reached the status of customary international law and is thus
binding on all members of the international community. The general
view has been that the 1954 Convention and its two Protocols have yet to
reach that status.54
50. Imposition of criminal liability on the holder of the property is applied only in
reference to cultural property under enhanced protection. See The 1999 Protocol art.
15(b).
51. Id. at art. 16.
52. Id. at art. 17.
53. See Draft Code Of Crimes Against The Peace And Security Of Mankind art. 9,
1996, adopted by The International Law Commission at its forty-eighth session, 1996, at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm [hereinafter "ILA Draft Code"] (prescribes
for the principle of "extradite or prosecute." The Commentary to Article 9 explains that:
"The fundamental purpose of this principle is to ensure that individuals who are
responsible for particularly serious crimes are brought to justice by providing for the
effective prosecution and punishment of such individuals by a competent jurisdiction."
See id. at Para. (2).
54. See, e.g., FLECK, supra note 13, at 379. "The law of the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1899 and 1907 is binding as customary international law of the whole
international community of states; the [1954 Convention], exclusively dedicated to this
matter, binds only a limited number of contracting parties." Id. See also the Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (which, in Article 35, specified the part of
conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of
international customary law. Its list of treaties did not include the 1954 Convention).
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Some scholars, however, have convincingly pointed to the
fulfillment of the conditions required for the norm to be considered as
customary law:55  1) The provisions of the 1954 Convention were
intended to be of norm-creating character; 2) There is a significant
number of state parties to that Convention;5 6 3) States' practice,
particularly those whose interests are most specifically affected (e.g.
Egypt, Greece, and Italy), has indicated a widespread acceptance of the
norms; and 4) States' practice derive from a sense of legal obligation
(opinio juris), as also supported by adherence to the 1954 Convention
principals by non-parties such as the U.S. Indeed, in the recent Strugar
Case,57 the ICTY concluded that Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute, which
specifically refers to the protection of cultural property, is a rule of
international humanitarian law which reflects customary international
law and applies to both international and non-international conflicts.
58
This development in the status of the rules protecting cultural property
was also acknowledged in a recent UNESCO declaration. 59 At the same
time, the norm has not reached the status of jus cogens,60 although the
progress in the field may suggest that such a norm may be developing.
61
The question still remains whether the recognition of the protection
of cultural property as customary international law, if accepted, would
necessarily provide that the war crime of destruction of cultural property
55. See David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its
Emergence into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349, 387-388 (1993).
56. As of January 2005, there are 113 states party to the 1954 Convention,
representing the majority of European, African and Asian states. See UNESCO.org.,
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, The Hague (May 14, 1954) at
http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (last visited April 8,
2005). States of North America and South America that are not members to the 1954
Convention are still obliged by the rules of the Roerich Pact. See Meyer, supra note 55.
57. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, Case IT-01-42-T (Jan.
31, 2005).
58. Id. at para. 230. Also noteworthy is that the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that
Article 19 of the 1954 Convention, which refers to the obligation of High Contracting
Parties to protect cultural property during conflicts not of an international character, have
become part of customary law. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision, ICTY Appeals
Chamber, para. 98, Case No. IT-94-1 (Oct. 2, 1995) (decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal Jurisdiction). See also Keane, supra note 12, at 21.
59. See the UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural
Heritage, Adopted by the thirty-second session of the UNESCO General Conference,
Paris, (Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinafter "UNESCO's 2003 Declaration"]. Its preamble reads:
"[Mindful] of the developments of rules of customary international law as also affirmed
by the relevant case-law, related to the protection of cultural heritage in peacetime as well
as in the event of armed conflict." Id. at Preamble.
60. Only few rules have been recognized as jus cogens norms. See PETER
MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 58
(Routledge, 7th revised ed. 1997).
61. See Forsyth, supra note 17, at 101.
[Vol. 23:4
2005] CRIMINALIZING DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 871
is also recognized as customary international norm. In reference to the
1954 Convention, it appears that a distinction should be made between
specific "technical" principles (such as the actual designs of the
protecting emblem of cultural property) and substantive rules based on
the traditional laws of war. While the former category is less likely to
represent customary international law, the latter one is, as previously
explained.62 Although the sanctions article (Article 28) is not, in and of
itself, part of the laws of war, it could arguably belong to the second
category. The conclusion that sanctioning individuals for the destruction
of cultural property in armed conflict is part of customary international
law is reinforced by the jurisprudence of the ICTY and by the inclusion
of versions of the crime in the 1999 Protocol and, more importantly, in
the Rome Statute, whose drafters aspired to reach a world-wide
consensus at the end of the Rome Conference.
C. The Status of the Crime Committed During Peacetime-Inter Pacem
Silent Leges ?
63
The earliest international document to protect cultural property in
times of peace (as well as in times of war) was the regional Inter-
American Roerich Pact signed in 1935 .64 Two international conventions
signed in the 1970's-the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property65 and the 1972 Convention-attempted to provide
further protection of cultural property primarily in peacetime.66 Two
more recent UNESCO conventions provide protection for other forms of
cultural property: Underwater cultural heritage,67 and intangible cultural
62. See Meyer, supra note 55, at 387. Article 19 of the 1954 Convention,
recognized as customary law by the ICTY, is an example for a substantive rule.
63. In Latin-"Does the law fall silent in peacetime?" This is a paraphrase to the
Roman maxim coined by Cicero "Inter Armas Silent Leges," meaning the law falls silent
during wartime.
64. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic
Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, T.S. No. 899, 167 L.N.T.S. 289. Article 1 of
the Pact provides that the "same respect and protection shall be accorded to the historic
monuments, museums, scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions in time of
peace as well as in war."
65. The Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted November 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter "The 1970 Convention"].
66. The two conventions may apply also to armed conflicts. For example, in the
Jokic Case, the ICTY took into account the fact that the Old City of Dubrovnik, which
was attacked by Serbian forces under the defendant's command, was listed on the World
Heritage List established by the 1972 Convention. See Prosecutor v. Jokic, Sentencing
Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, Case IT-01-42/1-S (Mar. 18, 2004).
67. The Convention of the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, adopted
in Paris, November 2, 2001 at http://erc.unesco.org/cp/
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A review of these international conventions reveals that while
destruction of cultural property in armed conflicts has been established as
an individual international crime-although not in an ideal format-the
protection of cultural property during peacetime is more ambiguous.
Only two of the above conventions-the 1970 Convention and the
Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention-provide general guidance to
member parties to impose legal sanctions on perpetrators. 69 Recent acts
of destruction during peacetime-in particular that of the Bamiyan
Buddhas in Afghanistan-have led UNESCO's members to call on all
states to take appropriate measures to hold perpetrators accountable for
their acts.70 At the same time, though, the Intangible Cultural Heritage
Convention, adopted by UNESCO the same day the Declaration was
pronounced, completely disregarded criminal responsibility. Thus, while
that Convention contributes to the general protection of cultural property
by enlarging the scope of the definition to include intangible heritage and
by establishing certain administrative mechanisms, it lacks substantial
enforcement tools.
That said, it would be far fetched to conclude that no legal
protection is given to cultural property in peacetime. Several
international conventions and declarations acknowledge the importance
of protecting individual and collective cultural rights.7 Accordingly, the
convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E [hereinafter "The Underwater Cultural Heritage
Convention"]. According to Article 27 of the Convention it shall enter into force three
months after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession. As of January 2005, there are three Member Parties to
the Convention. See id.
68. The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage,
adopted in Paris, October 17, 2003 at http://erc.unesco.org/cp/
convention.asp?KO = 17116&language=E [hereinafter "The Intangible Cultural Heritage
Convention"]. Article 34 of the Convention prescribes that the Convention shall enter
into force three months after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. As of April 2005, there are twelve
Member Parties to the Convention. See id.
69. See 1970 Convention art. 8; Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention art. 17.
Both articles resemble the language of article 28 of the 1954 Convention. See 1954
Convention art. 28.
70. See UNESCO's 2003 Declaration art. IV ("States should take all appropriate
measures, in accordance with international law, to establish jurisdiction over, and provide
effective criminal sanctions against, those persons who commit, or order to be
committed, acts of intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great importance for
humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or another
international organization").
71. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 18, 22, 27, adopted Dec.
10 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights art. 15, 27, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(a), adopted Dec.
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intentional violation of the right of an identifiable group to exercise its
tradition and culture by, for example, destructing objects of particular
cultural importance to that group, is akin to persecution against that
group on cultural grounds or even, in some cases, on ethnic and religious
grounds. That persecution, upon fulfillment of certain conditions, may
be considered a crime against humanity.
Crimes against humanity were first discussed at the Nuremberg
Trials, where a correlation between these crimes and crimes against
peace or war crimes was required by the Nuremberg Charter. However,
it is now firmly established in customary international law that crimes
against humanity are autonomous and that no nexus is required between
them and crimes against peace or war crimes.72 Thus, that category is
applicable for both peacetime and wartime crimes.
Prior to the establishment of the ICTY, it was difficult to draw a
clear-cut conclusion of courts' interpretation of the destruction of
cultural property as a crime against humanity. Although the Nuremberg
Tribunals convicted German Nazis of plunder, they seemed to regard
those acts only as a war crime.7 3 At the same time, the Tribunals found
that persecution of Jews was particularly apparent in the destruction of
their synagogues.74  A similar view was later expressed by the Israeli
District Court in the case of Eichmann.75 The Nuremberg Tribunal also
found that imposition of a massive fine on Jews after Kristallnacht (that
is, in "peacetime") and confiscation of possessions of inmates or
deported Jews were crimes against humanity.
76
Recent jurisprudence of the ICTY, while made in connection with
armed conflict, clarified that the destruction of cultural property may
amount to persecution and thus to a crime against humanity. The ICTY
Statute defined "persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds"
as crimes against humanity.77 Persecution on "cultural grounds" was not
16 1966, entered into force Jan. 3. 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 UNTS 3, reprinted in 6 ILM 360 (1967); The Convention concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official
Bull. 59, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991.
72. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 75-81, Case No. IT-94-1
(Aug. 10, 1995) (Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction); Darryl Robinson,
Defining 'Crimes against Humanity' at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45-
46 (1999).
73. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 25, at 76.
74. United States v. Goring, 1 International Military Tribunal: Trial of the Major
War Criminals 293, 295 (1946) (Rosenberg Judgment); see also Abtahi, supra note 24, at
26.
75. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 361 I.L.R. 5,
para. 57 (Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem 1961) (Israel); see also Abtahi, supra note 24, at 26.
76. See RATNER& ABRAMS, supra note 25, at 76.
77. ICTY Statute art. 5(h).
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specifically mentioned in the Statute. Nonetheless, the ICTY made the
link between the religious nature of buildings and institutions and their
cultural character. In the Blaskic case,78 the Trial Chamber made the
religious-cultural link in reference to attacks made by Serbian forces on a
mosque built at the town of Ahmici. The Tribunal concluded that the
attacks committed against the Muslim population and the edifices
symbolizing their culture "sufficed to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the attack was aimed at the Muslim civilian population., 79  The
Tribunal further concluded that destruction and plunder of property, in
particular of institutions dedicated to religion and education, amounts to
persecution.8 ° Similarly, in the Kordic Case, the Trial Chamber found
that acts of destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, when perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent,
amounts to an attack on the very religious identity of a people. As
such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of "crimes
against humanity," for all of humanity is indeed injured by the
destruction of a unique religious culture and its concomitant cultural
objects. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the destruction and
willful [sic] damage of institutions dedicated to Muslim religion or
education, coupled with the requisite discriminatory intent, may• 81
amount to an act of persecution.
The nexus between destruction of cultural property and the crime against
humanity of persecution has therefore been established.
Acknowledging the wider range of forms of persecution, the
drafters of the Rome Statute expanded the ICTY's definition of the crime
to read as follows:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of
78. Prosecutor v. Blasik, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-14-T
(May 3, 2000).
79. Id. at para. 425; Abtahi, supra note 24, at 27.
80. See id.; Blaskic, supra note 78, at part vi disposition. The Appeals Chamber
confirmed that attacks on civilian objects and destruction or pillage of property may
amount to a crime of persecution. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, ICTY Appeals
Chamber, para 149, 159, Case No. IT-95-14-T (July 29, 2004).
81. Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at para. 207,
Case No. IT-94-14/2-T.. 207. The Appeals Chamber confirmed that attacks on civilian
objects and destruction or pillage of property may amount to a crime of persecution. See
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 104, 108,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-A (Dec. 17, 2004).
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2
The term "persecution" was defined as "the intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason
of the identity of the group or collectivity."
83
The Rome Statute refers to the protection of a "group" or a
"collectivity." Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the Statute to include
not only minorities but also any distinct group of people subject to
persecutions. An example may be found in the direct targeting of
Cambodian's traditional art performers under the Khmer Rouge regime.
Accordingly, as far as the Rome Statute and potential jurisprudence of
the ICC will be invoked by the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers,
Khmer Rouge leaders should be held responsible for the persecution of
that distinct group of people.
Prosecution of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute
requires surmounting certain legal hurdles such as the prerequisite that
the crime was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against civilian population.84 In reference to the crime of persecution
there is an additional requisite condition: Article 7(1)(h) requires that
persecutions must be committed in connection to another crime within
the jurisdiction of the ICC or any act referred to in paragraph 1 (namely,
other inhumane acts such as murder or rape). Thus, the court does not
have jurisdiction to prosecute persecution per se.85 It has been argued
that, in practical terms, the requirement should not prove unduly
restrictive, since a review of historical acts of persecution shows that
persecution is inevitably accompanied by such inhumane acts.86
However, while that argument may be accurate in cases of crimes such
as murder or torture, it appears to be less persuasive in reference to
destruction of cultural property. For example, a systematic destruction of
religious sites of unique cultural value, conducted by a certain
82. Rome Statute art. 7(1)(h) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at art. 7(2)(g).
84. Id. at art. 7(1). However, persecution (or any other crimes against humanity)
may consist of a single act as long as it is part of the widespread or systematic attack.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-98-
32-A (Feb. 25, 2004). The court ruled that: "Although persecution often refers to a series
of acts, a single act may be sufficient, as long as this act or omission discriminates in fact
and is carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed
grounds." Id. at para. 113.
85. This element of the crime is inconsistent with the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. It
was added to ensure that persecution will not be simply an auxiliary offense or
aggravating factor. It is not necessary, however, to demonstrate that the connecting crime
was committed on a widespread or systematic basis: any instance of another criminal act
under the Rome Statute will suffice, even if it does not amount to a crime against
humanity in its own right. See Robinson, supra note 72, at 53-55.
86. Id.
20051
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government outside the scope of an armed conflict, may not necessarily
be in conjunction with any other crime under the Rome Statute, thus
these acts may go unpunished.
Moreover, the ICTY determined that the mens rea element of the
crime of persecution is higher than the one required for ordinary crimes
against humanity, although lower than the one required for genocide.8 7 If
this approach is adopted by the ICC, the already elevated threshold for
prosecuting crimes against humanity will be higher still.
An alternative route for prosecuting perpetrators under Article 7 of
the Rome Statute is found in the provision which criminalizes "other
inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health., 88 This residual
provision can provide a solution to the problems discussed in reference
to the crime of persecution (such as the required connection to other
crimes), although its open-ended nature will require interpretation by the
Court.8 9
To conclude, the current legal regime related to protection of
cultural property during peacetime still falls short of providing adequate
protection, particularly on the enforcement level as reflected by
international conventions. Unlike the protection of cultural property
during armed conflict, it appears that the customary status of the norms
governing peacetime conducts is still evolving.
90
At the same time, positive developments in the field are noteworthy.
They include, inter alia: 1) new trends in international law such as the
erosion of the concept of unconditional state sovereignty, enabling
international scrutiny and demands for accountability for crimes
conducted during peacetime; 2) the increasing universal awareness and
recognition of the importance of protecting cultural property also in
87. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 636, Case
No. IT-95-16-T (Jan. 14, 2000); Abtahi, supra note 24, at 28.
88. Rome Statute art. 7(l)((k). This article is similar to Article 5(i) of the ICTY
Statute and Article 3(i) of the ICTR Statute, both criminalizing "other inhumane acts."
89. Both the ICTY and the ICTR stressed that the decision whether the alleged
perpetrator's conduct rose to the level of inhumane acts should be determined on a case-
by-case basis. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgment, Trial Chamber,
para. 151, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez,
Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 117, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A (Dec. 17, 2004).
90. It has been proposed, however, that an opinio juris regarding the unlawful
character of destruction of cultural heritage also in peace time is emerging. See
Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a
Shared Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1209, 1219 (2004). The author based
his argument on the world-wide condemnation of the destruction of the Bamiyan
Buddhas and the unanimous adoption of UNESCO's 2003 Declaration, which represents
the will of the international community as a whole and applies, although as an instrument
of soft law, to both times of armed conflicts and times of peace.
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peacetime-as manifested by recent conventions and by UNESCO's
2003 Declaration; and 3) the potential establishment (although somewhat
restricted) of individual accountability through linking cultural
destruction and persecution or other inhuman acts amounting to crimes
against humanity. Accordingly, prosecuting the Khmer Rouge leaders,
who persecuted traditional performers, or the Taliban leaders who
intentionally ordered the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, may have
ample legal basis.9'
D. A Comment on Jurisdiction Issues in Domestic Courts
While the establishment and operation of international tribunals
clearly advance the rule of law, it is generally accepted that the
enforcement of international criminal law cannot depend solely on
international tribunals. 92  Indeed, the drafters of the Rome Statute
acknowledged the importance of the continuing role of domestic courts
in that field by determining that the ICC "shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions. 93  Accordingly, questions related to
jurisdiction of domestic courts are likely to arise. Due to the vastness of
that field, this sub-chapter will touch upon only certain issues related to
that matter.
94
First, with the exception of the 1999 Protocol, the existing
international conventions governing the field of protection of cultural
91. It is noteworthy that even if substantive criminal law enables prosecution of
perpetrators connected to the crimes conducted in Cambodia or Afghanistan, certain legal
obstacles may still need to be surmounted. For example, the ICC will not have
jurisdiction over those cases due to the ratione temporis limit prescribed by Article 11 of
the Rome Statute, according to which the ICC will have jurisdiction only with respect to
crimes committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute (July 1, 2002). This,
however, should not preclude the prosecution of perpetrators in other tribunals that may
be established in these countries such as the intemationally-assisted Cambodian tribunal
approved by the United Nations and Cambodia in 2004. See also Francioni & Lenzerini,
supra note 22 (the authors arguing that despite the fact that no international court or
tribunal had jurisdiction over the crimes committed in Afghanistan at the time of the
destruction of the Afghan cultural heritage or in the subsequent period, international law
is not entirely powerless with regard to violations committed by the Taliban, and an
international tribunal that may be established in Afghanistan ought to allow prosecution
of individuals responsible for the shameful destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan).
92. See Theodore Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89
AM.J.INT'L L. 554, 555 (1995); Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction after the Creation
of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503, 547 (2004). See
also ILA Draft Code, supra note 53, at Commentary to art. 8 (stating that, "As a practical
matter it would be virtually impossible for an international criminal court to single-
handedly prosecute and punish the countless individuals who are responsible for crimes
under international law." Id. at Commentary to Article 8, Para. (4).
93. Rome Statute Preamble and art. 1.
94. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI & NAFZIGER, supra note 9, at 974-981 (provides an
elaborate discussion of jurisdiction matters related to culture property).
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property do not cover issues of jurisdiction. As a result, when, for
example, an artifact is stolen in state A, stored in state B, the violator is a
citizen of state C and is detained in state D-there may be multiple
competent jurisdictions. The lack of clear jurisdiction provisions could
lead to conflicts of applicable law, inconsistency, unpredictability, and
even lack of enforcement. 95
It also appears that all criminal jurisdictional paradigms, namely the
territorial principle, the active and passive nationality principles, the
protective interest principle, and the universal jurisdiction principle, may
be applicable in cases of destruction of cultural property. Thus, a person
who ordered the destruction of cultural property or took an active part in
that act might face criminal charges not only in the country where the
crime took place (based on the territorial principle), but also in the
country of his or her nationality (based on the active nationality
principle). Indeed, the 1999 Protocol requires Member Parties to
96
establish jurisdiction based on the above two categories. Similarly, a
state from which an artifact has illegally been removed would be able to
exercise jurisdiction over an individual offender based on the protective
interest principle.97
The passive personality principle provides for jurisdiction over
aliens for acts abroad harmful to nationals of the forum.98 Accordingly,
it could be applied where the property destroyed was privately owned by
a national of the forum. An interesting scenario is created when the
property destroyed was not owned by a forum's national, yet was directly
related to his or her exercise of rights. An example is the destruction of
property of religious significance. Although the primary recourse of the
forum state may be found in a protest (or a similar remedy) on an
international state-to-state level, criminal charges based on passive
personality jurisdiction are also conceivable. In that respect, it is
noteworthy that the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence define the
term "victim" broadly enough to include not only natural persons but
also organizations and institutions that have sustained direct harm to
95. BASSIOUNI & NAFZIGER, supra note 9, at 976.
96. Article 16 of the 1999 Protocol requires each Member Party to take the
necessary legislative measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences listed in
Article 15 of the Protocol in the following cases: "(a) when such an offence is committed
in the territory of that State" [territorial jurisdiction]; and "(b) when the alleged offender
is a national of that State" [active personality jurisdiction].
97. BASSIOUNI & NAFZIGER, supra note 9, at 976. This paradigm, however, is meant
to establish jurisdiction primarily for acts that affect the security of the state. See IAN
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certain types of their property such as historic monuments. 99
The universal jurisdiction paradigm enables every state to bring
criminal charges against individuals "even in the absence of territorial,
nationality or other accepted contacts with the offender or the victim." 100
That category is particularly appropriate if the argument that destruction
of cultural property in an armed conflict is a violation of customary law
is accepted.' 01  If the forum state regards such an act to be an
international crime also when conducted during peacetime (for example,
by considering the act as a crime against humanity) then the paradigm
may be applied in that situation as well.
10 2
Invoking the universal jurisdiction paradigm is generally
permissive, 10 3 although Member Parties to the 1999 Protocol are obliged
to apply it and prosecute alleged perpetrators present in their territory in
certain cases. 10 4  UNESCO's 2003 Declaration, while non-binding,
presents a similar approach,10 5 Also noteworthy is that certain countries,
which have already incorporated the Rome Statute into their domestic
legal systems, could apply universal jurisdiction based on recently
enacted acts. Such is the case, for example, with Canada's Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, which establishes jurisdiction in
cases where the offence took place outside Canada and "after the time
the offence is alleged to have been committed, the person is present in
Canada."'' 0 6 The New Zealand act that implemented the Rome Statute
went even further, providing its court with jurisdiction to try Rome
Statute crimes
[R]egardless of: (i) the nationality or citizenship of the person
99. See Rule 85 [Definition of Victims] of the ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, which states: "For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence: ... (b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained
direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or
science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other
places and objects for humanitarian purposes." International Criminal Court, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add. 1 (2000).
100. See Meron, supra note 92, at 570.
101. See supra chapter 1.B.4.
102. BASSIOUNI &NAFZIGER, supra note 9, at 977.
103. See Meron, supra note 92, at 570; Bottini, supra note 93, at 516. It is
noteworthy that the ILA Draft Code prescribed for mandatory universal jurisdiction in
reference to grave crimes. See ILA Draft Code, supra note 53 at Commentary to Article
8, para. (9).
104. The 1999 Protocol requires each Member Party to establish jurisdiction when the
alleged offender is present in its territory "in the case of offences set forth in Article 15
sub-paragraphs (a) to (c)." See 1999 Protocol art. 16(c).
105. See Article VII of UNESCO's 2003 Declaration, supra note 70.
106. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24., art. 8(b). See
also the South African Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court Act, 2002, Government Gazette 18 July, 2002, which contains a similar provision.
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accused; or (ii)whether or not any act forming part of the offence
occurred in New Zealand; or (iii)whether or not the person accused
was in New Zealand at the time that the act constituting the offence
occurred or at the time a decision was made to charge the person with
an offence.
10 7
It appears that in all cases where invoking universal jurisdiction is
not mandatory, two factors will determine its application. The first is the
attitude of the international community in general and the forum state in
particular towards that jurisdictional principle.108  The second is the
discourse preferred in the debate over the definition and status of cultural
property between those regarding the property to be an asset of a given
state and those viewing cultural property as belonging to the entire world
community: 0 9 If the latter view prevails and the property destroyed is
considered as belonging to all humanity, universal jurisdiction is more
likely to be applied.
III. A Proposal for Defining Acts of Destruction of Cultural Property as
New Crimes under the Rome Statute
A. The Need to Articulate New Crimes and their Ideal Normative
Platform
The assessment of the international legal regime in reference to
criminalization of destruction of cultural property suggests an
anachronistic, incomplete and inconsistent approach. The term "cultural
property" does not even appear in the statutes establishing international
tribunals. These statutes apply incoherent tests to define cultural
property and focus on protecting certain forms of property-primarily
tangible immovable property-while disregarding the protection of other
forms of cultural property such as intangible property. They address the
conduct related to the attackers of the property, yet overlook the
107. Section 8(l)(c) of New Zealand International Crimes and International Criminal
Court Act, 2000 (N.Z.).
108. The revival of the universal jurisdiction principle in the last decade-see, for
example, the case regarding the extradition of Pinochet and the approach of the ILA Draft
Code-seems to be shifting back towards a narrower interpretation. See Luis Benavides,
Introduction Note to the Supreme Court of Spain: Judgment on the Guatemalan Genocide
Case, 42 I.L.M. 683 (2003). It has also been argued that, given certain legal and political
problems involved with the application of that jurisdictional paradigm, universal
jurisdiction should be replaced by the ICC for most crimes. See Bottini, supra note 92.
The International Court of Justice, in the case of (Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Belgium) 2002 I.C.J. 121 (General List, No. 121, Feb. 14, 2002) (the court refrained from
addressing the subject in its judgment, although opposing views were presented by the
Court's Judges in their separate opinions).
109. See infra chapter 2.F (discusses the internationalist-nationalist debate).
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culpability of the holder of the property. The statutes also preserve
obsolete doctrines such as "military necessity," which in the past were
invoked too frequently to the extent that they have become the rule rather
than the exception. Moreover, different levels of protection are accorded
to the same property in times of peace and in times of armed conflicts.
And since destruction of cultural property is sometimes pressed into
preexisting legal crimes (such as persecution), certain additional and
otherwise unnecessary preconditions have to be overcome to satisfy the
elements of these crimes.
Furthermore, the absence of a clear and modem definition of a
separate international crime influences the status of the crime, as such a
definition goes well beyond the actual charges brought against certain
individuals. It can provide a strong statement of the approach endorsed
by the international community towards the protection of cultural
property, one that sends an unequivocal message to perpetrators and
shifts the focal center of enforcement from the states' willingness to
sanction offenders to the international arena.' 10
Hence, it is proposed that separate crimes referring solely to the
destruction of cultural property be included in the list of international
crimes. The Rome Statute, which strives to represent the most
comprehensive approach to individual criminal responsibility under
international law, ought to serve as the normative platform for the
inclusion of the new crimes, despite its unwieldy mechanisms for
amendments.' 11
In that reference, it is noteworthy that although the 1999 Protocol
includes a list of offences, its enforcement mechanisms and international
status differ from that of the Rome Statute. First, as a protocol to the
1954 Convention, the 1999 Protocol was confined to the Convention's
general tenets (such as the "military necessity" doctrine) and could only
qualify them rather than completely remove them.' 12  Secondly,
adjudication of cases under the 1999 Protocol is left to domestic courts.
While that discourse may be more efficient in certain cases, it
nonetheless underestimates the potential impact the ICC's jurisprudence
will have. And lastly, as there are currently only twenty-six Member
Parties to the 1999 Protocol, it could not be considered as representing
I10. An example of the recognition of the international community of the need to
create a distinct category of crimes is found in the field of gender-related crimes. Until
recent years these crimes were dealt with-if at all-primarily through other crimes such
as torture. The developments in the field have finally led to the incorporation of separate
provisions in the Rome Statute dedicated to these crimes. Similar reasoning for that
welcome progress applies, mutatis mutandis, to the protection of cultural property.
111. See Rome Statute art. 121.
112. See Keane, supra note 12, at 29.
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the view of the international community on that subject."l3
Although technically it may be easier to include the new crimes
through amendments to existing provisions in the Rome Statute, it is
proposed to add the crimes in separate provisions to emphasize their
independent nature. The definitions of the new crimes will not require
amendments to other existing crimes (although such amendments may be
desirable on doctrinal grounds), as the latter also address acts that are
unrelated to destruction of cultural property. For example, Article
8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute, which criminalizes attacks against
certain objects (including buildings dedicated to art and historic
monuments), also protects immovable property such as schools and
hospitals that have not reached the status of cultural property. In cases
where such property is acknowledged as cultural property, it is suggested
that the new crimes will govern as lex specialis norms.
Assuming the proposed new crimes will be included within the
framework of the Rome Statute, it is also worth highlighting the
existence of general provisions in the Statute which provide for a
significant number of perpetrators that could potentially be held
accountable. Thus, for example, the doctrine of superior responsibility
Article 28 of the Statute could lead to prosecution of leaders who did not
prevent destruction of cultural property or did not punish the perpetrators
under their command for their acts of destruction.1 14  The tenets of
individual criminal responsibility, enumerated in Article 25 of the
Statute, could provide for prosecution of a person who, for example,
instigated for the destruction of cultural property or assisted the direct
perpetrators in "any other way."
In consideration of the definition of the new crimes, the following
points ought to be addressed: the categories where the crimes will be
located; the crimes' material elements (actus reus); the crimes' mental
elements (mens rea); and the definition of the term "cultural property."
The following sub-chapters will discuss these issues.
113. It is noteworthy, though, that if the proposition for the definition of the new
crimes in the Rome Statute is accepted, the enforcement legal tools of the 1999 Protocol
will complement the Rome Statute mechanisms. For example, the 1999 Protocol could
be invoked if the ICC lacks jurisdiction over a particular case. The Rome Statute does
not affect the validity of the 1999 Protocol (or any other international instruments), as
indicated by Article 10 of the Rome Statute: "Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for
purposes other than this Statute." See Rome Statute art. 10.
114. The doctrine of superior responsibility has been incorporated in the ICTR Statute
(Article 6(3) of the Statute) and the ICTY Statute (Article 7(3) of the Statute) and was
developed in the Tribunals' jurisprudence. For example, in the Strugar Case, the Trial
Chamber found the accused guilty of not stopping the unlawful shelling of the Old Town
and of not punishing the perpetrators. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial
Chamber, at para. 446, Case No. IT-0 I -42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
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B. Categorization of the Crimes
Based on the discussion so far, it is apparent that protection of
cultural property is required for both war times and peace times.
Accordingly, the new crimes ought to be located in two categories-War
Crimes (Article 8 of the Rome Statute), and Crimes against Humanity
(Article 7 of the Rome Statute), which cover crimes conducted in
peacetime as well as during armed conflicts. The Rome Statute
recognizes certain acts to be both a crime against humanity and a war
crime, 1 5 thus there is no impediment to listing the crimes related to
destruction of cultural property in both categories.
A third potential category for addressing the destruction of cultural
property is that of the crime of Genocide. 1 6 A full discussion of the
legal repercussions of destruction that amounts to "Cultural Genocide"
exceeds the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that customary
international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking
the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group and thus
does not recognize an enterprise attacking only the cultural or
sociological characteristics of a human group to fall within the definition
of genocide. 1 7 It is noteworthy, though, that attacks on cultural and
religious property and symbols of the targeted group may serve as
evidence of the element of mens rea required for the commission of the
crime of genocide." 8
C. Attacking Cultural Property as a New War Crime
In comparison to crimes against humanity, most elements of the war
crimes listed in Article 8 are found within the definition of the crimes
themselves. It is proposed to add the new crime to the list of "other
serious violations of the laws and customs" in both international and
non-international armed conflicts." 9 The crime will be defined as
follows: "[a]ttacking, by whatever means, cultural property, any
structure that contains cultural property, or their immediate
115. See, e.g., Rome Statute art. 7(1)(t); art. 8(2)(a)(ii) (the crime of torture).
116. Id. at art. 6. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at para. 229,
n.779, Case No. IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005)
117. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 576-580, Case
No. IT-98-33 (Aug. 2, 2001). In its discussion, the Trial Chamber mentioned a decision
of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which presented a different, broader
approach to the definition of the crime, one that is aimed also at protecting the social
existence of the group as opposed to its purely biological existence. Id. at para. 579. See
also Francioni, supra note 90, at 1218.
118. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 580, Case No.
IT-98-33 (Aug. 2, 2001).
119. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b) and (2)(e).
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surroundings."
The elements of the crime will be: 1) the perpetrator attacked;
2) the object of the attack was cultural property or any structure that
contains cultural property or the immediate surroundings of the protected
property or the structure containing it; and 3) the perpetrator was aware
of the factual circumstances that established the status of the property or
the structure containing the property and intended that property,
structure, or their immediate surroundings, to be the object of the attack
nonetheless.
1. Explanation of the Material Elements
A mere attack is banned, regardless of whether or not it resulted in
damage to the property. This approach ensures better protection for
cultural property and is consistent with the elements of the existing crime
that bans an attack on protected objects (Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome
Statute) as well as with the pertinent articles of 1977 Protocols.1 20 The
phrase "by whatever means" was added to encompass every sort of
attack which could cause damage to cultural property. 21
The proposed crime also protects from attacks moveable property
located inside structures such as libraries and archives that on their own
would not be considered as cultural property. The crime therefore
incorporates the already existing notion of protecting such structures
from attacks, as reflected in article 1 of the 1954 Convention, while
avoiding the conceptually inaccurate inclusion of these structures within
the definition of cultural property in that article. 
122
Another notion derived from the 1954 Convention and the 1999
Protocol is the ban on attacks directed at the immediate surroundings of
the cultural property or the structure containing cultural property. 123 That
ban is aimed at mitigating the effects of "collateral damage," namely
destruction caused to cultural property as a result of an attack directed at
a nearby target with no recognized protected status. That ban will
120. Seesuprach. 1.B.1.
121. That phrase was used in Article 8(2)(b)(v) of the Statute: "Attacking or
bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are
undefended and which are not military objectives." See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(v).
122. Article 1(b) of the 1954 Convention refers to buildings whose main and effective
purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property; Article 1(c) of the
Convention refers to centers containing a large amount of cultural property. See 1954
Convention art. 1.
123. See 1954 Convention art. 4(1) (the article requires High Contracting Parties to
refrain from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings for purposes which
are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict); 1999
Protocol art. 15(1)(b) (the article criminalizes the use of cultural property under enhanced
protection or its immediate surroundings in support of military action).
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complement the general protection provided by the Rome Statute against
excessive incidental damages. 124 The phrase "immediate surroundings"
will require implementation on a case-by-case basis, by taking into
account considerations such as the actual distance between the military
target and the protected property and the weapon to be used in the attack.
The proposed new crime abolishes the anachronistic "military
necessity" doctrine. While that proposal presents a different approach
than the one found in the Rome Statute and the 1954 Convention, it is
still in accordance with other international humanitarian conventions.
For example, the Roerich Pact and the 1949 Geneva Conventions both
require unconditional protection of cultural property.
125
In fact, by definition, cultural property should not be a military
objective or serve as any other military purpose. The only justified
exception to that rule is found in cases where the protected property is
attacked or otherwise used in self-defense. In such cases, the accused
can rely on the general rules which exclude criminal responsibility.126 In
all other incidents, armed forces ought to refrain from attacking or
otherwise utilizing cultural property or a structure containing cultural
property, and employ other means to capture or neutralize them. An
example for an alternative method used recently in an armed conflict was
the siege of a church in Bethlehem by Israeli forces, where suspected
terrorists sought to find haven. Despite continuous shootings from
124. Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv). That crime is not recognized in non-international
armed conflict, although there appears to be no convincing reason for that distinction.
The main difference between that crime and the new proposed crime is that the latter
prescribes a complete ban on an attack regardless of whether the potential results are
excessive or not, while at the same time limits the protected zone to the immediate
surroundings of the property (a limitation that does not exist in Article 8(2)(b)(iv)). Both
crimes, however, do not purport to eliminate collateral damage altogether. While that
result is certainly desirable, it seems unrealistic to entirely forbid a conduct that may
produce some sort of damage or harm to innocent people or cultural property.
125. See Keane, supra note 12, at 19.
126. Article 31(l)(c) excludes criminal responsibility when:
The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in
the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person
or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military
mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or
property protected. The fact that the person was involved in a defensive
operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for
excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph. See Rome Statute
art. 31(l)(c).
The result of applying that rule may be a qualification of the "military necessity"
doctrine rather than a complete abolishment. The tenets of self-defense, however, are
well-accepted even in reference to grave crimes and include important safeguards such as
a requirement for proportionality. The article clearly presents an exception to the rule
and will hopefully be interpreted narrowly to avoid a "back door" introduction of the
"military necessity" doctrine.
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within the church, the soldiers surrounding the church refrained from
returning fire. Following negotiations conducted between the belligerent
sides through third parties, an agreement for the withdrawal of the
suspected terrorists from the church was reached and the church was left
intact.
2. Explanation of the Mental Element
The drafters of the Rome Statute chose to address the question of
the mental element (mens rea) in a general provision, which serves as a
"default rule" regarding the required mental elements of all crimes listed
in the Statute. Article 30 of the Statute determines that "unless otherwise
provided" a person shall be held criminally responsible only if the
material elements of the crime were committed with an "intent and
knowledge."
Accordingly, the elements of the crimes listed in Articles 6-8 of the
Statute do not include the required mental elements, unless the drafters
sought to clarify the mental element or to provide an exception to the
general rule. These exceptions could be related to both the intensity of
the intent or knowledge requirements or to the scope of the mens rea
coverage.
27
Similar to the existing provision related to destruction of protected
objects (Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Statute), the new proposed crime
requires the perpetrator to intend the protected property, the structure
containing it or their immediate surroundings, to be the object of the
attack. Adding the word "intentionally," as was done in other war crimes
(including the above article), appears to be superfluous. Also noteworthy
is that specific intent does not require any legal appreciation of the
protected status of the attacked objects, but rather only awareness of the
factual circumstances that give the property special protection (e.g. its
status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site). That requisite is consistent
with other existing war crimes related to destruction of property. 1
28
D. Improper Use of Cultural Property as a New War Crime
The proposed new war crime related to attacks on cultural property
does not address the crucial problem of the improper use of cultural
property by its holder. As mentioned above, that rampant phenomenon
was thus far dealt with only by the 1977 Protocols and to some extent
127. See The International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes and Rules of
Procedure and Evidence 30-31 (2001) (edited by Roy S. Lee).
128. See, e.g., Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Rome Statute art. 8(2)(e)(xii) (the crime
of destroying or seizing the enemy's property).
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also by the 1954 Convention and the 1999 Protocol. In its current
format, the Rome Statute explicitly forbids only the use of civilians and
protected persons as "human shields. 129 One plausible proposal may
therefore be to amend that article by adding a phrase which criminalizes
the utilization of cultural property for gaining immunity from military
operations.1 30  This potential amendment, however, will not cover all
cases of forbidden use of cultural property by its holder. For example,
mere stocking of piles of ammunition in a protected building puts the
property at risk, regardless of whether or not that act was meant by the
holder to provide immunity against an impending attack.
Hence, it is proposed to add to the list of "other serious violations of
the laws and customs" in both international and non-international armed
conflicts a new war crime, which will be similar to the crime found in
Article 15(1)(b) of the 1999 Protocol. The new crime will read:
"Utilizing cultural property or any structure that contains cultural
property or their immediate surroundings in support of a military action."
The elements of the crime will be: 1) the perpetrator utilized
cultural property or any structure that contains cultural property or their
immediate surroundings for any purpose which is in support of a military
action; 2) the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established the status of the property or the structure containing the
property and intended that property, structure, or their immediate
surroundings, to be utilized in support of a military action nonetheless.
I. Explanation of the Material Elements
Similar to the other proposed new war crime, there is no
requirement for any specific damage, but rather the mere usage of the
protected property in support of a military action is forbidden, thus
ensuring better protection for cultural property. Furthermore, there is no
requirement that a related military action has actually been carried out.
Omitting that requirement prevents the unnecessary burden of proving a
causal link between the usage of the property and an ensuing military
action. At the same time, the usage of the property is required to be in
the general context of an armed conflict, as the new proposed crime
belongs to the category of war crimes.
As is the case with the other proposed new crime, the scope of
protection was expanded to include structures containing cultural
129. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
130. Amended Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) will read as follows: "Utilizing the presence of a
civilian or other protected person or utilizing cultural property to render certain points,
areas or military forces immune from military operations." See id. at amended art.
8(2)(b)(xxiii) (amendment underscored).
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
property such as libraries and museums in order to protect cultural
property such as paintings and small articrafts, which by themselves
cannot serve for military purposes, yet may be at risk due to the usage of
the structure they are located within for such purposes. Similar
reasoning exists in reference to the military-free zone of the property's
immediate surroundings.
2. Explanation of the Mental Element
The mental element is similar to that of the other proposed new war
crime, namely it requires an awareness of the factual circumstances of
the status of the protected property and a specific intent to utilize it in
support of military action.
E. Destruction of Cultural Property as a New Crime Against Humanity
Defining destruction of cultural property as a new crime against
humanity is desirable for at least two reasons: First, to emphasize the
gravity of the crime, since crimes against humanity are considered
serious international offences. The second, and perhaps most important
reason, is to protect cultural property also during peacetime. 
131
Ideally, a new proposed crime against humanity ought to mirror the
new war crimes proposed in the previous sub-chapters, thus ensuring a
unified approach towards the crime of destruction of cultural property in
both peacetime and wartime. However, the structure and shared
elements of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute
render inherent dissimilarities in comparison to the war crimes defined
under Article 8 of the Statute. For example, the chapeau of Article 7
requires that crimes against humanity will be conducted "as part of a
widespread or systematic attack."' 132  Conversely, Article 8 does not
contain that threshold, although it is provided that the ICC will exercise
its jurisdiction "in particular when the crime was committed as part of a
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes."
33
Another important distinction between war crimes and crimes
against humanity is that the former may criminalize certain conducts
regardless of their outcome. 134 In contrast, crimes against humanity
require, as part of the material element, damage or harm to be inflicted
on the victims (through extermination, enslavement, sexual violence,
131. Naturally, the new proposed crime against humanity will also apply to armed
conflict and for that purpose it will complement the new proposed war crimes.
132. Rome Statute art. 7(1).
133. Id. at art. 8(1).
134. See supra ch. 2.C.
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etc.). 3 5 Furthermore, the nature of the crimes listed in Article 7 renders
that the harm inflicted is to be severe. 136 Accordingly, if the new crime
against humanity adopts the language of the new proposed war crimes
verbatim and criminalizes the mere attack on or utilization of cultural
property, it will not be consistent with the general doctrinal approach
towards crimes against humanity as reflected in the Rome Statute.
The differences emanating from the general schemes of Article 7
and Article 8 of the Rome Statute therefore dictate that certain disparities
between the protections provided to cultural property in armed conflicts
and in peacetime will persist. While undesired, that outcome appears to
be inevitable considering the current framework of the Rome Statute.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is proposed to define the new
crime against humanity as follows: "Causing severe damage to cultural
property." The elements of the crime will be: 1) the perpetrator caused
severe damage to property; 2) the property damaged was cultural
property; and 3) the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances
that established the status of the property and intended that property to be
severely damaged nonetheless.
1. Explanation of the Material Elements
As explained, all crimes against humanity necessitate serious harm
to have been inflicted, thus the new proposed crime will also require
actual and acute damage, although it is not required that the damage
caused be irreversible.
As for the general requirements of Article 7, it is noteworthy that a
single act causing severe damage to cultural property may constitute a
crime against humanity, as long as it was "committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack." 137  Moreover, while Article 7
criminalizes an "attack directed against any civilian population," that
135. A general exception to that requirement is found in the criminalization of an
attempt to commit a crime. See Rome Statute art. 25(3)(f). Hence, a fruitless attack may
be considered as an attempt to cause destruction of cultural property that yields individual
criminal responsibility.
136. Grave harm is inherent in certain crimes against humanity such as murder, thus
these crimes did not necessitate further elaboration in the Statute. In cases where doubts
could arise in reference to the required level of the harm inflicted, the drafters of the
Rome Statute incorporated phrases that underscore the prerequisite for grave
consequences of the forbidden conduct. See, e.g., id. at art. 7(1)(e), "imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law;" art. 7(1)(k), "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health;" and
art. 7(2)(g) "'persecution' means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental
rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity"
(emphasis added).
137. Seesupra ch. 1.C., n.73.
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attack does not have to involve military means, 138 and could be carried
out by the holder of the property-the government, for example. The
expression "directed against" specifies that "in the context of a crime
against humanity the civilian population is the primary object of the
attack."' 3 9 This, however, does not render that only conducts targeted at
the physical well-being of humans are criminalized. Rather, the
expression should be construed broadly to also include acts such as
destruction of property (cultural or other) that cause severe harm to
civilian population. That interpretation is consistent with the case-law
regarding the crime of persecution,140 as well as with the general goal of
Article 7 to protect "humanity" and not only "humans." Indeed, culture
is one of the main characteristics of the human race and thus ought to be
protected for the sake of humanity.'
4
'
It is also worth mentioning that, in exceptional circumstances, a
governmental or organizational policy that deliberately fails to take
actions may be considered an attack amounting to a crime against
humanity, although the existence of such a policy "cannot be inferred
solely from the absence of governmental or organizational action.' 42
Accordingly, neglecting a historic monument or an archeological site is
unlikely to yield criminal responsibility. Conversely, if governmental
officials purposely ignore on-going attacks against protected property
while possessing the means to be aware of these attacks and the ability to
take appropriate steps to prevent the attacks and punish the perpetrators,
they may be held responsible for their inaction.
143
138. Rome Statute art. 7 (Elements of Crimes, Intro., para. 3).
139. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber,
para. 421, Case No. IT-96-23-1 (Feb. 22, 2001).
140. See supra ch. I.C.
141. See Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 207,
Case No. IT-94-14/2-T (Feb. 26, 2001). The Trial Chamber held that destruction of
institutions dedicated to religion "amounts to an attack on the very religious identity of a
people. As such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of "crimes against
humanity," for all of humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious
culture and its concomitant cultural objects." Id.
142. See Rome Statute art. 7 (Elements of Crimes, Intro., para. 3, n.6):
A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be
implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in
exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take
action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence
of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or
organizational action. Id.
143. See The International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes and Rules of
Procedure and Evidence 76 (2001) (edited by Roy S. Lee).
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2. Explanation of the Mental Element
A common element of all crimes against humanity under the Rome
Statute is that the perpetrator had "knowledge of the attack." 144  The
drafters of the Statute stressed, however, that it is unnecessary to prove
that "the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or
the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization."'' 45
Also noteworthy is that both the ICTR and the ICTY concluded that
constructive knowledge (and not only actual knowledge) of the broader
context of the attack may fulfill the "knowledge" requirement of crimes
against humanity. 
146
The specific mental element of the new proposed crime against
humanity, namely the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the status of the property and the intention to damage it, are
consistent with both the new proposed war crimes and with the approach
found in several existing crimes against humanity.147  The intent to
damage the protected property could be inferred from evidence such as
the deliberate attack on the protected property and the fact that protective
UNESCO emblems were posted on the property.
14 8
F. The Definition of Cultural Property
The introduction of new crimes to the Rome Statute requires a
definition of the term "cultural property." As Article 8 of the Statute
(War Crimes) does not include a list of definitions, the proposed
definition will be best located among the definitions enumerated by
Article 7(2) of the Statute (Crimes against Humanity), and a reference
144. Rome Statute art. 7(1).
145. See Rome Statute art. 7 (Elements of Crimes, Intro., para. 2).
146. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 659,
Case No. IT-94-1 (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgment, Trial
Chamber, para. 134, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (May 21, 1999). It is important to note that
the expression "with knowledge of the attack" does not appear in the ICTY and the ICTR
Statutes. It remains to be seen if the ICC adopts the jurisprudence of the ICTR and the
ICTY on that point.
147. See, e.g., Rome Statute art. 7(l)(e), criminalizing "Imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law."
The elements of the crime require the perpetrator to be aware of the factual circumstances
that established the gravity of the conduct. Id.
148. For example, in the Strugar Case, the intent to deliberately destroy cultural
property-the required mens rea for convictions under Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute,
which is similar to the mental element of the proposed new crime against humanity-was
inferred from the evidence of the deliberate attack on the Old Town of Dubrovnik; the
renown cultural and historical character of that property as a UNESCO World Heritage
Site; and the fact that protective UNESCO emblems were visible to the attackers of the
property. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, at para. 329, Case
No. IT-01-42-T (Jan. 31, 2005).
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should also be made to that definition in the new proposed war crimes
under Article 8.
The definition of cultural property is complex, has evolved over the
years, and differs from one contemporary legal source to another. 149 A
full discussion of the subject exceeds the scope of this paper, thus only
certain key points will be addressed in order to provide the general
framework for the paper's proposal for the new definition.
First, the definition ought to be broad enough to include various
forms of existing cultural property as well as potential future types of
protected property. Hence, it is recommended to phrase the definition in
general terms, preferably with several illustrative examples, rather than
lay-out an exhaustive list of types of property which may be regarded as
cultural property. 5 °
Secondly, it is recommended to include intangible cultural property
within the definition to ensure the protection of a variety of important
cultural forms such as oral traditions, performing arts, and social
rituals. 15 1 Until recently, these important aspects of cultural property
received little recognition on the international level, thus many of them
were, and still are, exposed to complete extinction. The inclusion of
intangible cultural property within the definition is also a step towards
the harmonization of the different legal regimes currently governing
intangible and tangible cultural property, a prominent objective recently
advocated for by UNESCO's leadership.1
52
149. A different definition of cultural property is found in all three major international
Conventions regulating that field: the 1954 Convention, the 1970 Convention, and the
1972 Convention.
150. An example of the list-type definition is found in article 1 of the 1970
Convention. An example of a general definition which includes concrete examples is
found in the 1954 Convention.
151. See Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention art. 2 (provides a definition of
intangible cultural heritage).
152. A symposium entitled 'Safeguarding of Tangible and Intangible Cultural
Heritage: Toward an Integrated Approach', co-sponsored by UNESCO and the Japanese
Cultural Agency, was held in Nara, Japan, in October 2004. The Director-General of
UNESCO, Koichiro Matsuura, insisted in his opening remarks on the need "to pay
attention to the totality of cultural heritage of nations and communities so that protection
measures are not only adapted to each component but also mutually supportive where
possible." In that regard, he added, the development of cooperation between the two
major UNESCO Conventions dealing with the protection and safeguarding of the
tangible and intangible heritage will be of outmost importance. He reiterated "the need
for the harmonization of definitions and for the development of a consistent set of
heritage policies," and concluded his remarks by stating that "a new, inclusive and,
where appropriate, unified vision of heritage" and "an integrated approach, which
respects the diversity of cultures and which acknowledges the interdependencies of
tangible and intangible heritages as well as their autonomy, will have to be studied and
translated into concrete measures of implementation." See UNESCO.org.,
"Safeguarding of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage: Toward an Integrated
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In addition, the test for determining cultural property as such should
not be based on the property's purpose but rather on its cultural value.1
53
The cultural value test also rises above-and thus avoids-other general
or legal characterizations of property which are inappropriate for the sake
of protecting cultural property. Accordingly, the definition will apply to
a given property regardless of the property's origin or ownership,
whether it is moveable or immovable, or whether it is used for religious
or secular purposes.
A related question is whether to create within the category of
cultural property sub-categories that are based on differences in cultural
value. That concept was applied in the 1954 Convention and the 1999
Protocol. 154 However, the legal regime of special or enhanced protection
given to property "of very great importance" was meant to accommodate
the constraints of the "military necessity" doctrine by providing further
(although not complete) immunity for the "high level" protected
property.155  Upon the removal of that doctrine-as proposed by this
paper-there appears to be no justification for creating sub-
categorization within the definition or by creating separate crimes related
to destruction of different protected property.
That said, the importance of a particular property could still be
acknowledged in the prosecution process in the following ways: First,
the ICC's Prosecutor may take into account the fact that the property
damaged was of particular importance to human heritage upon deciding
whether to initiate an investigation and later prosecute. 5 6 Similarly, the
Court may take that fact into account upon discussing the gravity of the
Approach (Oct. 20, 2004) at http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=82&idnews=89 (last
visited April 8, 2005).
153. See supra ch. 1.B.2. The actual wording of the test-whether, for example, the
property is to be considered of "great importance" (see 1954 Convention art. 1) or of
"outstanding universal value" (see 1972 Convention art. 1)-appears to be less
significant. See also the ICTY discussion regarding the differences between Article I of
the 1954 Convention and Article 53 of 1977 Protocol I: "Article 1 of the Hague
Convention of 1954 refers to property which is "of great importance to the cultural
heritage" and not as in Article 53 of Additional Protocol I, to objects which "constitute
the cultural or spiritual heritage." The Commentary on the Additional Protocols states
that despite this difference in terminology, the basic idea is the same, and that the cultural
or spiritual heritage covers objects whose value transcends geographical boundaries, and
which are unique in character and are intimately associated with the history and culture of
a people." See Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para.
91, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A (Dec. 17, 2004).
154. Chapter II of the 1954 Convention intended to provide "special protection" to
certain forms of property; Chapter 3 of the 1999 Protocol created a separate category of
property under "enhanced protection."
155. See 1999 Protocol art. 15(a) and art. 15(b) (both criminalizing acts related only
to cultural property under enhanced protection).
156. See Rome Statute art. 17 and art. 53.
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crime and in determining the aggravating factors as part of the
sentencing of convicted perpetrators.
57
Another challenging dilemma to be addressed is whether the
definition should empower individual states to designate cultural
property or whether the cultural value test will be based on universal
standards. That conundrum is linked to the debate between two schools
of thoughts-the nationalist view (cultural nationalism) and the
internationalist one (cultural internationalism). 158  Cultural nationalism
reflects the notion of state sovereignty by providing states with the sole
power of assigning cultural property as such. An example for that
approach is found in the 1970 Convention.159  Conversely, cultural
internationalism views cultural property as belonging to the heritage of
the world, "independent of property rights or national jurisdiction."'' 60
Accordingly, the definition of cultural property under that school of
thoughts will be based on general terms such as the property's
importance to humankind. Examples for that approach are found in the
1954 Convention and the 1972 Convention.161
The nationalists approach presents a very clear test for recognizing
cultural property, an important characteristic for a definition related to
criminal law, and is also likely to be favored by certain parties to the
Rome Statute concerned with erosion of state sovereignty. Nonetheless,
leaving the decision-making power to states may threaten the protection
of cultural property in cases where states are not party to the Rome
Statute, are unwilling to protect the property, or worse still are directly
responsible for the property's destruction, as was the case of the
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas.
It is not surprising then, that scholars' inclination towards the
internationalist approach has inspired drafters of recent international
157. For example, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that while attacking civilian
buildings is a serious violation of international humanitarian law, it is a crime of even
greater seriousness to direct an attack on an especially protected site such as the Old
Town of Dubrovnik. See Prosecutor v. Jokic, Sentencing Judgment, ICTY Trial
Chamber, para. 53, Case IT-01-42/1-S (Mar. 18, 2004).
158. The distinction between these two outlooks on cultural property was first
outlined by Professor John Henry Merryman. See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of
Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AMER. J. INT'L. L. 831, (1986).
159. Article 1 of the 1970 Convention reads: "For the purposes of this Convention,
the term 'cultural property' means property which, on religious or secular grounds, is
specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art or science and which belongs to the following categories .. " See
1970 Convention art. 1.
160. Merryman, supra note 158, at 831; Birov, supra note 3, at 225.
161. Article 1 of the 1972 Convention defines cultural heritage based on its
"outstanding universal value." 1972 Convention art. 1. Article 1 of the 1954 Convention
defines cultural property based on its "great importance to the cultural heritage of every
people." 1954 Convention art. 1.
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instruments to take this path. For example, the Preamble of UNESCO's
2003 Declaration begins by "Recalling the tragic destruction of the
Buddhas of Bamiyan that affected the international community as a
whole." Article 11(2) of the Declaration defines "intentional destruction"
as an act intended to destroy in whole or in part cultural heritage in a
manner which constitutes a violation of international law or an
"unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates of pubic
conscience." Articles VI and VII of the Declaration correspondingly
attach responsibility for both states (for failing to prohibit, prevent, stop,
and punish intentional destruction) and individuals who were involved in
intentional destruction of "cultural heritage of great importance for
humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO
or another international organization." 1
62
It is therefore proposed to adopt a similar approach in the new
definition of "cultural property" under the Rome Statute, namely one that
is based on the property's importance to humanity rather than its
designation as such by State Parties. The Court will have to construe the
phrase chosen for the definition and apply it on a case-by-case basis,
based on specific evidence of the property's importance (e.g. being listed
on the World Cultural Heritage List) or by utilizing general judicial
interpretation tools.
Based on the discussion thus far, the proposed definition of the term
"cultural property" will read as follows:
"Cultural Property"--Human created property of great importance
for humanity, irrespective of the property's origin or ownership, its
territorial or geographical location, its tangible or intangible nature,
whether it is moveable or immovable, whether it is used for religious
or secular purposes. Such property will include, inter alia, historical
monuments, archeological sites, works or arts, books, and people's
unique skills and traditions.
IV. Conclusion
This paper assessed the status of criminalization of cultural property
under international law and concluded that by now it is considered a
grave crime, particularly in relation to armed conflicts and to some extent
also to peacetime. In both cases, though, a stronger and clearer message
by the international community is yet to be proclaimed, thus a definition
of new international crimes dealing exclusively with destruction of
162. The explicit reference to cases where certain property is not inscribed on a list
maintained by international organization is meant to address situations such as the
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, which were not listed as a protected site at the time
of their destruction.
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cultural property ought to be deliberated. The definitions of the new
crimes should also include a modem and broad definition of the term
"cultural property" to provide it with the utmost protection. The
platform for the inclusion of proposed international crimes ought to be
that of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which, despite its cumbersome
mechanisms for amendments, currently strives to represent the most
comprehensive approach to individual criminal responsibility under
international law.
